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Abstract: Although a late starter with regard to privatising State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Ireland was 
recently ranked 8th among OECD countries in terms of relative privatisation activity.  This paper presents the 
first detailed analysis of the programme since the first divestiture in 1991. It explores how the rationale for 
selling SOEs has evolved and argues that privatisation has been pursued on the basis of multiple (sometimes 
conflicting) objectives. One goal that has been common to all divestitures has been that of improving 
company performance. Although we find evidence that SOEs achieve ‘static’ efficiency gains in the pre-
privatisation period, the available evidence fails to support the hypothesis that privatisation brings about 
sustained improvements in enterprise performance. Privatisation has also been pursued in order to raise 
exchequer revenues and achieve certain distributional goals. Although the levels of share discounts and 
expenses have been low by international standards the government has foregone significant revenues by 
granting sizeable share ownerships to workers.  Consequently workers along with institutional investors rank 
among the ‘winners’ from privatisation whereas small shareholders (in the case of Eircom) and the exchequer 
have incurred significant losses. Importantly, there is little to suggest that privatisation per se has yielded 
significant gains to the consumer. This raises questions about the sequencing of measures of privatisation and 
liberalisation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has become an 
important instrument of industrial re-organisation.  The OECD (2003) estimates that over the past 
two decades more than 100 countries worldwide have adopted privatisation policies.  
Privatisation, as well as measures of de-regulation, has had major consequences for the ownership 
and structure of major industries around the world.  In global terms, Ireland has been a relative 
latecomer with regard to adopting privatisation policies but in recent years a number of SOEs have 
been transferred to private ownership. When considered in connection with the liberalisation of 
markets such as energy, telecommunications and public transport, privatisation has had a marked 
impact on the composition of the Irish public enterprise sector as well as the structure of important 
markets.  It has also had significant effects in terms of corporate performance, employment and 
equity markets.   
This study examines Ireland’s programme of privatisation.  It focuses on the sale of SOEs rather 
than other forms of privatisation such as contracting-out and public private partnerships.  It details 
the privatisation programme to date and briefly examines the rationale for selling SOEs in the Irish 
context.  It proceeds to examine the effects of privatisation in terms of corporate performance, 
public finances and the distributional aspects of privatisation including the impact on employment 
and share ownership. 
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2. REASONS FOR AND EXTENT OF PRIVATISATION WORLDWIDE 
Privatisation has been a truly global phenomenon.  Different regions and countries around the 
world have embraced privatisation to different degrees with the result that the role of SOEs has 
declined considerably.  Megginson et al (2001) show that the share of GDP accounted for by 
SOEs in industrialised counties fell from 8.5 per cent in 1984 to less than 6 per cent in 1991 and is 
now below 5 per cent.  For low-income countries the reduction has been more dramatic with a 
reduction from almost 16 per cent of GDP to below 5 per cent.  Similar reductions were recorded 
in middle-income countries (which include the transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe). 
 
Among industrialised countries the UK and New Zealand were the first real pioneers of 
privatisation.1  Parker (1998), in a review of the privatisation experience in the EU, found that the 
UK leads the rest of Europe in terms of the value of assets sold and the extent to which it has 
adopted other forms of privatisation.  He also notes that in recent years however, privatisation 
activity has intensified in other member states of the EU such as Spain, Portugal and Greece.   
 
The growing popularity of privatisation programmes can be attributed to a host of reasons with the 
precise rationale varying from country to country.  Writers such as Kay and Thompson (1986), 
Parker (1998), and the OECD (2003) have explored these reasons and with regard to industrialised 
countries the following arguments dominate: (1) that SOEs are inefficient and that privatisation 
will lead to improved economic efficiency; (2) that technological developments in markets such as 
telecommunications and electricity generation have rendered monopoly provision of certain goods 
and services obsolete.  This has been an important factor in driving the liberalisation agenda set by 
the EU; (3) that selling SOEs can contribute to reducing government debt and remove the risk of 
future capital injections into loss-making SOEs and; (4) that the divestiture of SOEs can make 
useful contributions to developing domestic capital markets. 
 
2.1 Improving Efficiency 
 
The fundamental economic case for privatising SOEs is that the change in ownership leads to 
improved enterprise performance.  This conclusion is drawn from theories of government failure 
such as agency, public choice and property rights theories.  In general the relative inefficiency 
arising from public ownership is attributed to continuing political involvement in their 
management, soft budget constraints and the absence of competition (Stiglitz, 1991).  Transferring 
enterprises to the private sector and the introduction of competitive product markets can bring 
about changes in organisational structure, alter owner and manager objectives and improve 
monitoring, information and incentive structures (Bös, 1991).  The expectation is that these 
changes will lead to improvements in operating efficiency. 
 
Prior to the mid-1990s, empirical studies on the performance of public enterprise focused on 
comparisons between public versus private sector enterprises rather than the impact of 
privatisation per se.  Comparative studies have been reviewed by a number of writers (e.g. 
Boardman and Vining (1989), Borcherding et al (1982), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Bös (1991), 
Martin and Parker (1997)).  Conclusions vary from study to study and overall they fail to provide 
clear-cut evidence of the superiority of either type of ownership.  Moreover the studies vary in 
terms of aspects such as timing, sectors covered and performance measures used.  Martin and 
 
1 Stevens (1992) found that New Zealand and the UK had implemented the biggest privatisation programmes.  Revenues 
from sales in New Zealand accounted for 14.1 per cent of GDP over the period 1987-91.  The equivalent figure for the UK 
(1979-91) was 11.9 per cent. 
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Parker (1997) conclude that the evidence does point to superior profitability in private enterprises 
but caution that profit is not necessarily an appropriate measure especially where markets are not 
competitive.  High profits may be due to over-charging consumers rather than from reducing costs 
of production.  Where studies focus on cost and productivity measures, the proposition that SOEs 
are relatively inefficient is more likely to be supported where firms operate in a competitive 
environment.  “Where monopoly conditions exist, particularly in water supply and in gas and 
electricity transmission and distribution, state regulation may dull efficiency incentives in the 
private sector” (Martin and Parker, 1997: 76). 
 
Since the mid-1990s a host of studies covering the impact of privatisation on enterprise 
performance have been published.  Megginson and Netter (2001) surveyed empirical studies on 
the performance effects of privatisation in transition and non-transition countries.  Almost all of 
these studies examine the impact of privatisation in terms of output, efficiency, profitability, 
capital investment and leverage.  They conclude that the 22 studies of privatisation in non-
transition economies “offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatization is 
associated with improvements in the operating and financial performance of divested firms.  
Several of the studies offer strong support for this proposition and only Martin and Parker (1995) 
document outright performance declines (for six of eleven British firms) after privatisation” 
(2001: 356). 
 
It is noteworthy that the exception to these findings was a study by Martin and Parker (1995).  
These writers, in conjunction with others, have published a number of reviews and studies on 
privatisation and performance in the UK.  Martin and Parker (1997) conducted an in-depth study 
of eleven companies privatised in the UK since 1979.  Performance was examined in terms of a 
host of financial and productivity measures while controlling for business-cycle effects.  Taking 
all eleven companies together they conclude that there is little evidence of a systematic 
improvement in performance and, notwithstanding problems with performance measurement, they 
arrive at this conclusion using a range of measures (1997: 216).  They also conclude that the 
relationship between ownership, competition, regulation and performance is more complex than 
they would ever have imagined.   
 
Focusing on the relationship between these issues in the context of utility industries, Parker (2003) 
publishes a more recent review of studies from the UK and finds that a number of studies were 
“unable to reject the null hypothesis that ownership has no effect on performance” (2003: 85).  In 
a number of cases performance improvements recorded continue a trend that pre-dates 
privatisation.   
 
One explanation for mixed results is as follows: 
 
“The greatest scope for efficiency gains occurs in utility industries where previously 
monopoly suppliers existed.  Where state industries operate in competitive markets 
there is less scope for management to make large efficiency gains after 
privatisation.  Presumably enterprises must have already been reasonably efficient 
to have survived in competitive markets, at least in the absence of continued state 
subsidies. Competition and regulation are important in providing the necessary 
incentives for management to seek out efficiency gains following privatisation.  
Therefore until competition and regulation significantly impact efficiency gains will 
be limited” (2003: 78). 
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2.2 Privatisation as a Response to Competition and Technological Developments 
 
Technological developments and their interaction with the liberalisation of markets (in the EU 
driven by common EU directives) have provided a basis for privatisation in certain sectors 
previously characterised by state ownership.  This has been particularly evident in the case of 
telecommunications.  The continuing digitalisation of electronic communications and services has 
resulted in a convergence, which sees a range of networks and industries that traditionally 
operated independently of each other now finding themselves either competing directly or relying 
on each other (Massey and Daly, 2002).  These developments have undermined traditional 
arguments in favour of public ownership (for example natural monopoly arguments) and in the EU 
the response has been to apply pressure on member states to open utility markets to competition.  
Telecommunications markets in all EU member states were gradually de-regulated prior to full 
liberalisation, which came into effect on January 1st 1998.1   
 
In sectors such as gas, electricity and telecommunications, privatisation has been used as a vehicle 
to enhance competition by providing an opportunity for sector restructuring where governments 
replace state-owned monopolies with several competing firms and, in the case of network 
industries, establish third party access and competition rules.  Privatisation measures have also 
been adopted in response to the enforcement of EU competition laws restricting state aids to 
public enterprises.  Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome forbids state aid that distorts competition 
between member countries.  Although the European Commission has not always been successful 
in preventing governments from supporting loss-making industries (Parker, 1998) there have been 
cases where governments have advanced these restrictions as a justification for divestiture (for 
example, Irish Steel). 
 
2.3 Raising Exchequer Revenues and Improving Public Finances 
 
Most governments view privatisation as a means of improving public finances.  In the UK for 
instance, the Thatcher governments used accounting conventions to deduct the proceeds of 
privatisation from the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).  This essentially amounted to 
a sleight of hand in the accounting sense as privatisation proceeds are financing government 
expenditure and should therefore be added to the PSBR.  This was recognised by the EU 
commission, which disallowed privatisation receipts in the calculation of budget deficits under the 
Maastricht criteria.  Nevertheless, privatisation receipts can be used to reduce government debt, 
which will indirectly reduce budget deficits via lower interest payments. 
 
From an economic perspective the key question is how does privatisation affect the net worth of 
the public sector?  Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 185-188) describe how it is necessary to 
distinguish between the short-term and long-term effects of privatisation on government accounts 
in order to determine its real economic position.  In the short-term, the net effect depends on how 
much the exchequer borrowing requirement (EBR) is reduced by the sales proceeds, the 
company's payment of interest and dividends and the capital expenditure programme of the 
company.  However, if the company is profitable (which is a realistic assumption) its profits move 
out of the public sector accounts thereby increasing the EBR. 
 
In the long-term, the financial impact depends on whether the assets are correctly priced and on 
 
1  Ireland was granted a partial derogation from the provisions of the final directive, which removed final restraints on 
competition in telecommunications markets.  Full liberalisation took effect in December 1998. 
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the issue of transaction costs (e.g. promotion and professional fees).  In essence, an asset is 
correctly priced if the sale price equals the discounted value of all future income streams to the 
government.  If the government receives this price and does not incur any transaction costs, its net 
worth does not change.  Neither of these circumstances is likely to occur, however.  The situation 
becomes more complicated when one takes the impact of privatisation on company behaviour into 
account.  If the company improves its performance after privatisation and this is accounted for in 
the price, then the net worth of the government depends on the direct and indirect costs incurred in 
the process of privatisation.  Indirect costs arise due to underpricing of shares or the allocation of 
shares at preferential rates to employees.  Direct costs include promotion, advisory, financial, legal 
and accountancy fees. 
 
On the question of indirect costs, most authors agree that the extent of undervaluation varies 
according to the method of sale and to the various underlying political and economic objectives of 
privatising governments.  Some see discounting shares as a ‘cost’ that governments should avoid 
in order to maximise the returns accruing to the Exchequer.  For example, Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988) and Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) claim that the extent of underpricing observed in the U.K. 
was due to the ‘flawed’ methods of sale chosen by the government and argue that selling a 
company’s equity in several tranches is superior to selling all the shares at once.  Nevertheless, 
there are many reasons why governments may choose to issue new equities at a discount.  These 
include the requirement to entice small shareholders to purchase new shares and to avoid possible 
embarrassment if shares are unsold.   
 
Estimates of the cost of underpricing indicate that they involve significant revenues foregone by 
governments.  For example, Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) estimate ‘avoidable discounts’ based on 
the typical discounts observed in similar private-sector issues.  They estimated that the cost of 
underpricing in the case of UK privatisations amounted to approximately £2.5bn between 1979 
and 1991, or nearly 8 per cent of proceeds.  In their analysis of the French privatisation 
programme, the authors also find that if the normal discount for the sale of a company was taken 
to be 5 per cent, the revenue forgone by the French government between 1986 and 1987 amounted 
to some €1.2 billion, or nearly 10 per cent of proceeds. 
 
In relation to direct costs, the magnitude of privatisation expenses incurred in the early UK 
privatisations attracted much criticism with expenses in the case of British Gas for example, 
amounting to £360 million.  Wright and Thompson (1994) note that concerns over the size of 
these expenses resulted in closer attention being paid to project management in subsequent 
flotations.  They estimate that expenses averaged 6.4 per cent of gross proceeds in the UK before 
1990 and that these were reduced on average to between 2.4 and 2.8 per cent for later sales 
(Wright and Thompson (1994: 60).  The comparable estimate in the case of Australian sales was 
just over 3 per cent (Harris and Lye, 2001).   
 
Despite the significance of these direct and indirect costs it is evident that that raising exchequer 
revenues is an attractive feature of privatisation for governments.  Consequently, Parker (1999) 
notes that it is commonplace for governments in the EU to announce targets for annual sales as 
part of their budget forecasts and countries such as France, Italy and Portugal have passed 
legislation to limit the use to which privatisation receipts can be put.   
 
2.4 Capital Market Development 
 
For many OECD countries the need for well-developed equity markets as a means of channelling 
investment and the need to strengthen the institutional investor presence in domestic equity 
markets underscores capital market development as an explicit objective of privatisation (OECD, 
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2003:24).  In some countries (for example, Spain, Portugal and Austria) privatisation was used as 
a means of developing capital markets whereas in others (for example, the UK and to a lesser 
degree France and Germany) privatisation served to augment what was already there.   
 
More specifically, privatisation has been used as a means of achieving the capital market objective 
of broadening share ownership and attracting small investors to buy shares.  In the UK, the 
Conservative government emphasised this objective.  However, it is unclear whether this objective 
has been achieved.  The early indications from the UK were that share ownership had widened but 
not deepened, with small shareholders investing in very few companies and often investing for 
short-term speculative gains.2  In Germany roughly one-half of the two million citizens who 
bought shares in Deutsche Telecom in 1996 sold their shares within a year (Parker, 1999). 
 
The following sections examine the Irish privatisation experience.  First we detail the extent of 
privatisation in Ireland to date and seek to identify the rationale for various sales.  We proceed to 
examine the experience to date in terms of enterprise performance, government finances and key 
distributional aspects of privatisation to date. 
3. PRIVATISATION POLICY IN IRELAND TO DATE           
Prior to 1991 there were few examples of privatisation in Ireland.  It is noteworthy that the 
privatisation option was largely eschewed throughout the 1980s despite a growing fiscal crisis and 
the obvious attraction of privatisation revenues.3  In some cases enterprises were retained under 
public ownership in order to serve political and social objectives such as maintaining employment 
and fostering regional development.4  Moreover, the first social partnership agreement – the 
Programme for National Recovery – enunciated policies that aimed to expand rather than privatise 
the SOE sector.5   
The early 1990s however, witnessed a gradual shift in policy concerning the ownership of SOEs.  
This coincided with a significant change in the political context with the pro-privatisation 
Progressive Democrats (PDs) entering government for the first time as the minor party in the new 
coalition formed in 1989.  The second social partnership agreement – the Programme for 
Economic and Social Progress – which was signed in 1991 set out a number of principles in 
relation to SOEs including agreed principles on the questions of private involvement in the shape 
of joint ventures and the sale of shares.6  These developments coincided with the decisions to 
privatise two SOEs, Irish Sugar Company (now Greencore) and the state-owned insurance 
company, Irish Life Assurance, by initial public offering (IPO) in 1991.   
These divestitures failed to serve as harbingers of a systematic programme of privatisation.  
Besides the sales of two ailing companies as going concerns (B&I in 1992; and Irish Steel in 
1995) there was no significant privatisation activity until the flotation of shares in Eircom in July 
1999.  This sale represented the first high-profile privatisation in the case of Ireland.  Over 
 
2 A survey by the Confederation of British Industry in 1990 estimated that, of 10.6 million individual shareholders, only 14 
per cent owned shares in four or more companies, while no fewer than 61 per cent owned shares in only one (quoted in 
Saunders and Harris, 1994: 144) 
3 Ireland’s public finances deteriorated considerably in the 1980s.  By 1986, the ratio of debt to GNP had reached an 
unsustainable 129 per cent. 
4 Sweeney (1990:47) asserts that in the 1970s and 1980s there were “open cases of government directives to companies to 
keep plants open which management considered to be unviable such as Irish Sugar’s Tuam plant and several ESB stations”. 
5 Allen (2000: 14) asserts that when the Programme for National Recovery was agreed in 1987, the Taoiseach, Charles 
Haughey, promised the trade unions that Fianna Fáil would not sell off any commercial SOEs. 
6 Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991: p.59) 
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500,000 citizens purchased shares in the newly privatised utility following an exchequer funded 
advertising campaign specifically focused on small investors.  The initial consensus was that the 
sale was a success and that all remaining public enterprises were candidates for transfer to private 
ownership.  This consensus was short-lived however due to the collapse of the Eircom share price 
and subsequent break up of the company.7 
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the sale of Eircom, four SOEs have subsequently 
been privatised.  In 2001, three state-owned banks, which had been earmarked for privatisation 
since the early 1990s, were taken over by private institutions and the Irish National Petroleum 
Company (INPC) was sold to the US oil company Tosco.   
Overall, privatisation has had an appreciable impact on the Irish economy.  The data in table 1 
shows that total government proceeds from privatisation have amounted to €8.13bn.  When 
measured as a percentage of national income, privatisation proceeds in Ireland are sizeable by 
OECD standards.  Measuring privatisation proceeds relative to the size of the economy, the OECD 
(2003) ranked Ireland eighth out of 29 OECD countries over the period 1990-2001.   
 
Table 1:  Privatisation of Irish State-Owned Enterprises 1991-2002 
 
Company Year Sector Exchequer 
Proceeds 
(€m) 
Method of Sale 
Greencore IPO in April 
1991 
Sugar/Food 210.65 IPO and Placements 
Irish Life IPO in July 
1991 
Insurance 601.93 IPO and Placements 
B&I 1992 Shipping 10.80 Trade Sale 
Irish Steel 1994 Steel 0 Trade sale 
Eircom IPO in July 
1999 
Telecommunications 6,399.91 Trade sale and IPO 
ICC Bank Jan 2001 Banking 322.27 Trade Sale 
TSB Bank April 2001 Banking 408.35 Trade Sale 
INPC May 2001 Energy 20.00 Trade Sale 
ACC 
Bank 
December 2001 Banking 154.60 Trade Sale 
Total   €8,128.51  
Notes:  (1) This excludes the sale of Cablelink to NTL.  In this case the sale proceeds were accrued to Telecom Éireann 
(Now Eircom).  (2) IPO – Initial Public Offering (3) In the case of Irish Life, Greencore and Eircom, companies were 
privatised in stages.  The dates provided refer to the dates of the IPO. 
                                                 
7 Eircom was taken over by the Valentia Telecommunications Consortium.  When Eircom was de-listed from the Irish 
Stock Exchange in December 2001, the 450,000 small shareholders who retained their shareholding in Eircom had incurred 
a 30 per cent loss. 
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In addition, privatisation has had a significant impact on the composition of companies in the SOE 
sector, with the State no longer directly involved in the telecommunications, banking or food 
sectors.  Table 2 lists the remaining eleven Irish SOEs as of mid-2004.  In most cases the State 
retains ownership in companies that hold dominant or monopolistic market positions.  In recent 
years government policy on remaining SOEs has been characterised by the introduction of 
competition and the consideration of the privatisation option.  Aer Lingus, the state-owned airline, 
is expected to be part privatised.  Competition has been introduced in the electricity, health 
insurance and broadcasting sectors and the state-owned airports company (Aer Rianta) and 
transport company (CIE) are being broken up and subjected to competition.  Since the mid-1990s 
most SOEs have been instructed to examine alternative ownership structures (for example, 
strategic alliances).  In addition, a new regulatory framework has been developed with the 
establishment of independent regulators in sectors such as energy, communications and aviation 
and the establishment of the Competition Authority in 1991. 
Table 2: Commercial State-Owned Enterprises in Ireland 2004 
 
Company and Sector Established Principal 
Activity 
Market Power 
in Principal Activity 
Finance    
Voluntary Health Insurance 1957 Health Insurance Duopoly 
 
Communications 
   
An Post 1984 Postal Services Monopoly 
Radio Teilifís Éireann 1960 Broadcasting Competing 
 
Energy 
   
Bord Gáis Éireann 1976 Gas Distribution Monopoly 
Bord na Móna 1946 Peat Production Competes 
Electricity Supply Board 1927 Electricity Limited Competition 
 
Natural Resources 
   
Arramara Teo 1949 Seaweed Processing - 
Coillte Teo 1989 Forestry Dominant 
 
Transport 
   
Aer Lingus 1936 Air Transport Competes 
Aer Rianta 1937 Airports Dominant 
Coras Iompair Éireann 1944 Rail and Road Transport Dominant 
 
 
One of the interesting questions that arise in connection with Ireland’s privatisation programme 
concerns government objectives in relation to different divestitures.  This question is commonly 
addressed in studies of privatisation in other countries and comparative studies show that the 
motivation for privatisation programmes varies across jurisdictions.  For example, the privatisation 
programme in the United Kingdom, which dates back to the late 1970s, was driven by a dominant 
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pro-market discourse that argued for privatisation on the grounds that it promised improvements 
in economic efficiency.  However, in his comparative study of privatisation in the EU, Parker 
(1998) notes that this argument struck a chord in some but not all member states.  Instead he finds 
that “privatisation in the EU results from forces including the ‘fashion’ to privatise evident 
worldwide but more pragmatically, expediency” (1998: 2).  Ireland represents an example of the 
latter with the privatisation programme to date based on pragmatism rather than attachment to a 
particular ideology.  Consequently the executions of individual sales have been based on a mixed 
set of reasons that vary across cases.  Evidence of the multiplicity of objectives attributed to 
privatisation is illustrated in the case of Irish Sugar/Greencore (and they apply equally to the case 
of Irish Life which was also privatised in 1991). 
For a number of years, the Chairman and Chief Executive of Irish Sugar made the case for 
privatisation on the basis that injections of capital were necessary if the company was to expand, 
diversify and improve performance.  As the government was reluctant to sanction further capital 
injections, the principal rationale for privatisation was that it offered the best means of widening 
the company’s equity base which was necessary to ensure further improvements in company 
performance.  There is however, evidence that privatisation was being driven by additional 
considerations.  In his budget speech in 1990 the Minister for Finance, Mr. Albert Reynolds, 
highlighted the importance of exchequer based considerations when he  
“…made a prudent provision in the White Paper on Receipts and Expenditure for a 
further increase in sales [of state assets] in the current year.  This is the first phase 
of a new five-year programme of such sales so as to reduce the national debt.”  
(Budget Book, 1990:34). 
 
There was also evidence that at the outset, privatisation policy was partly based on the desire to 
attract small shareholders.  In the case of Greencore, special provisions were made for the 
allocation of shares to employees and beet growers, while the initial public offering was weighted 
in favour of small investors with small applications (below 140 shares) met in full and larger 
applications scaled back. 
Discerning the objectives of privatisation in the cases of the two divestitures that followed (B&I 
Line and the Irish Steel Company in 1992 and 1996 respectively) is relatively straightforward.  
Both companies were in serious financial difficulty before privatisation and the decisions to sell 
were demonstrably attributable to the desire to remove loss-making companies from the State 
balance sheet.   
By the mid-1990s, Ireland’s increased integration within the European Union brought a new set of 
factors, which had a significant bearing on public enterprise policy in Ireland.  The central thrust 
of EU policy has been the removal of restraints on trade resulting from regulation and while 
official EU policy reflects a neutral stance on ownership of industry, the effective impact of policy 
has been to encourage privatisation.  Examples of relevant policy include: 
• The Maastricht criteria for eligibility to join the single European currency, which made 
the sale of SOEs attractive as proceeds could be used to retire public debt; 
• Restrictions on state aids to industry under Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome and; 
• The requirement for liberalisation of utility markets.  
 
The latter factor in particular influenced the decision to privatise Telecom Éireann, the state-
owned telecommunications company.  Although finally sold in 1999, the privatisation process 
could be traced back to 1991 when the company chairman called for privatisation as a response to 
the challenges posed by increased competition and technological change.  This precise rationale 
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underpinned subsequent decisions in relation to ownership of the company.  In 1996 the decision 
was taken to enter a strategic alliance with an established player in the European 
telecommunications market.  This involved the sale of 20 per cent of Telecom Éireann’s share 
capital to the Comsource consortium consisting of PTT Telecom BV and Telia AB.8 With the 
Progressive Democrats back in government following the 1997 General Election the drive towards 
privatisation was accelerated.  Shortly before the full liberalisation of the telecommunications 
market came into effect in December 1998, the Government announced its intention to dispose of 
its remaining shareholding in the company.  The initial public offering of Telecom shares took 
place in July 1999.   
The three state-owned banks (ICC, ACC and the Trustee Savings Banks) commanded small 
market shares of the Irish banking markets.  Historically the ICC and ACC were heavily 
subsidised by the State (Sweeney, 1990a) and their future (and possible privatisation) had been 
under consideration since the early 1990s.  The decision to privatise was attributable to the desire 
to eliminate state involvement in the banking sector.  When outlining the history of the proposed 
sale of the ICC bank, the Minister asserted that the Government decided to “dispose of the State’s 
interest in ICC Bank plc as there is no longer any significant strategic or policy justification for 
continuing direct state involvement in the banking sector”.9 
The rationale for the sale of the Irish National Petroleum Company (INPC) in 2001 was based on 
the opportunity to de-regulate the company’s operations. The company relied on a mandatory 
regime whereby private oil distributors were required to source 35 per cent of their sales from the 
INPC. When presenting the Bill to privatise the company, the Minister stated that the mandatory 
regime “was a poor substitute for a proper commercial environment for the Company within the 
mainstream oil industry”.10  Concern was expressed that dependence on the mandatory regime 
was likely to increase, as large-scale investment was required to meet new emission standards for 
motor fuels.  On the basis of these considerations the Government sought a buyer for the 
company.   
In conclusion, it is evident that Ireland’s privatisation programme to date has been based on a 
policy driven by pragmatism with decisions made on a case-by-case basis.  Although reasons such 
as restrictions on further public investment have been advanced to justify some cases, a common 
rationale has been that privatisation will improve company performance. The evidence also 
demonstrates the perceived merits of privatisation as a useful means of raising revenues for the 
exchequer. The potential impact of privatisation on various stakeholders has also shaped decisions 
in relation to privatisation policy.  Concerns about job losses had been an important consideration 
in SOE policy and in recent years more favourable labour market conditions have eased the 
passage of SOEs to the private sector.  Moreover, since the sale of Eircom, the norm has been to 
establish Employee Share Ownership Programmes (ESOPs) amounting to 14.9 per cent of shares 
in newly privatised companies.  With small shareholders also encouraged to participate in sales by 
initial public offering it is evident that privatisation policy has been directed towards the 
achievement of certain distributional objectives.  The following sections examine the Irish 
privatisation experience in terms of these discernible objectives. 
 
8 PTT Telecom became Royal KPN NV in 1998 and was the national telecommunications company of the Netherlands prior 
to the liberalisation of EU telecommunications markets in 1999.  Telia AB was the Swedish national telecommunications 
company prior to the same date. 
9 Minister of State at Dept. of Trade, Enterprise & Employment, Mr. Noel Treacy, Dáil Éireann Debates Dec. 8th, 1999. 
10 Minister for Public Enterprise, Mrs. Mary O’Rourke, Dáil Éireann Debates June 20th, 2001. 
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4. PRIVATISATION AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE 
Of the different reasons advanced in support of privatisation policy, the goal of improving the 
efficiency of former SOEs has been most prominent. Studies of performance most commonly 
adopt measures of profitability, productivity and costs of production.  Profitability measures are 
however, unsuitable where enterprises operate in imperfectly competitive markets, which is the 
case for most SOEs.  Consequently, productivity measures are preferred but these are also subject 
to limitations.  Labour productivity measures can be biased for reasons such as the use of output 
rather than value-added as a numerator and the prevalence of contracting out labour intensive 
services. Total factory productivity measures face reliability problems due to difficulties in 
measuring capital accurately (Parker, 2003).   
Besides the difficulties inherent in performance measurement our study of the performance of 
privatised companies in Ireland is conditioned by the following factors: 
• the number of companies is relatively small with nine companies privatised to date; 
• six of the nine privatised companies were sold by trade sale and absorbed into the 
operations of the acquiring company.  As a result post-privatisation data is available for 
three companies only. Moreover, Eircom was privatised in 1999 thereby limiting the 
post-privatisation period; 
• with the exception of Eircom, privatised companies operate under competitive 
conditions; 
• four of the companies operate in the financial sector and analysis of the Irish Life 
Assurance Company in particular requires sector-specific measures. 
Bearing these factors in mind this analysis of the performance of privatised companies examines 
the pre- and post-privatisation periods separately.   
4.1 Pre-Privatisation Performance 
Firms that have been privatised to date differ significantly in terms of size, sector and performance 
history.  The first two sales in 1991 were of relatively successful commercial entities.  These were 
followed by the sales of two firms which were in serious financial difficulty.  In 1999 the State 
disposed of its first utility company while the next disposals were of the three state-owned banks 
and the INPC11 which all had different performance records. 
Looking first at the loss-making companies, the British and Irish Steam Packet Company (B&I) 
facing increased competition from the airline sector, entered the 1990s in severe financial 
difficulty.  At the end of 1989 the company had accumulated losses of €163m and a capital 
deficiency of €33.6m (Barrett, 1998).  As a small stand alone company in a much bigger European 
and global market, the Irish Steel Company was in financial difficulty since the early 1970s.  It 
received more capital than any other state company and recorded losses of over twice its turnover 
in the early 1980s (Sweeney, 1990).12  Table 3 shows indicators of the average annual rates of 
change in performance in the five-year period prior to privatisation.  Despite conducting 
 
11 The INPC is not included in our analysis.  The volatility of the global oil market within which the company operated 
distorts profit-based indicators, which were subject to wide fluctuations in the years preceding privatisation.  Consequently 
rates of growth measures are not instructive. 
12  Irish Steel received capital of approximately €235m over the period 1980-1993. 
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significant programmes of rationalisation13 in the years prior to divestiture both companies 
continued to perform poorly and in both cases the decision to privatise was justified as the only 
means of ensuring that the companies continued as going concerns.   
 
Table 3: Pre-Privatisation Performance of loss-making SOEs 
 - Average Annual Rates of Growth  
 
Company Employment 
% 
Turnover 
% 
Sales Efficiency 
% 
PBIT 
% 
ROCE 
% 
Irish Steel -1.76 -2.75 -1.42 -135.15 -183.32 
B&I -14.59 -11.28 4.85 -63.92 -124.15 
 
Notes: (1) Sales Efficiency = Turnover/Employees; PBIT = Operating profit before interest, tax and exceptional items; 
ROCE = PBIT / Net Assets Employed. (2) Irish Steel rate of growth is a five year average.  B&I rate of growth figure is a 
four year average.  
 
Up to the late 1980s, the Agricultural and Industrial Credit Corporations (ACC and ICC) were 
poor performers in financial terms.  Established to provide credit for farmers and the industrial 
sector, both banks focused on serving niche markets and lacked the scale necessary for expanding 
their share of the Irish banking market.  Moreover they relied heavily on the State for subsidies in 
the form of guarantees on foreign exchange borrowings (Sweeney, 1990).14  Aided by the rapid 
growth of the Irish economy in the 1990s, both the ACC and ICC banks and the Trustee Savings 
Banks (TSB) significantly improved financial performance in terms of income and profitability.  
Table 4 shows the average annual growth rates for a number of indicators over the five-year 
period prior to privatisation.  Average growth in profits before interest and tax (PBIT) ranged 
from 8.25 to 22.45 per cent in the period covered.  The more instructive return on assets (ROA) 
and cost-income ratios however indicate that underlying performance was less impressive for both 
the TSB and ACC.  In 2001 these banks exhibited cost to income ratios of 68 per cent compared 
to a national average of 60 per cent.15  ICC Bank did however record significant improvements 
across all indicators prior to privatisation with a notable reduction in its cost/income ratio from 52 
per cent in 1995 to 37 per cent in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Between 1980 and the year of divestiture B& I shed 56 per cent of jobs and Irish Steel shed 41 per cent. 
14 In the 1980s both banks engaged in foreign borrowing while lending at “attractive rates”.  Government guarantees were 
in respect of foreign exchange losses on these borrowings.  Sweeney (1990:23) reports that in the case of ICC, guarantees 
amounted to €67.4m in the five years to 1990.  These exceeded the banks reserves of €44.4m. 
15  In 2001 the average cost/income ratio (a standard efficiency indicator in the banking sector) in the Irish banking sector 
was 60 per cent compared to a EU average of 62.66 per cent and a US average of 60.39 per cent (The Banker Magazine, 
July 2002). 
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Table 4: Pre-Privatisation Performance of State-Owned Banks  
- Average Annual Rates of Growth (%) 
 
Company Employment 
% 
Income 
% 
Sales 
Efficiency 
% 
PBIT 
% 
ROA% 
 
Cost/ 
Income 
% 
ACC 3.35 8.40 4.84 8.25 -6.89 0.25 
ICC 2.67 11.30 8.54 22.45 1.38 -6.11 
TSB N/A 4.69 N/A 11.25 -0.46 -0.37 
 
Notes: (1) Sales Efficiency = Income/Employees; PBIT = Operating profit before interest, tax and exceptional items; ROA 
(Return on Assets) = PBIT / Net Assets Employed. Cost / Income = (Operating Expenses – Provisions) / Total Operating 
Income. (2) Growth rates for ACC based on a four-year average.  Growth rates for other companies based are five year 
averages (3) TSB employment figures unavailable, consequently no figure available for sales efficiency.  
The general conclusion therefore is that the pre-privatisation period was one of improved 
performance for the state-owned banks but that these improvements must be viewed in the context 
of decades of government subsidisation in the cases of the ACC and ICC Banks.  Furthermore, the 
small scale of operations presented a major obstacle to the achievement of sustained 
improvements in efficiency and provided strong grounds for a change in ownership 
Table 5: Pre-Privatisation Performance of SOEs sold by IPO - Average Annual Rates of 
Growth (%) 
 
Company Employment 
% 
Turnover 
% 
Sales 
Efficiency 
% 
PBIT 
% 
ROCE 
% 
Greencore -6.47 3.57 11.51 20.09 2.46 
Eircom -1.93 8.49 10.66 5.77 6.00 
 
Notes: (1) Sales Efficiency = Turnover/Employees; PBIT = Operating profit before interest, tax and exceptional items; 
ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) = PBIT / Net Assets Employed. (2) Growth rates are five-year averages. 
 
Turning to the three SOEs privatised by initial public offerings of shares on the stock market, 
tables 5 and 6 show that each company exhibited significant performance improvements in the 
years prior to divestiture. The Irish Sugar Company (now Greencore) implemented an extensive 
programme of rationalisation before flotation in 1991.  Between 1980 and 1990 the level of 
employment in Irish Sugar was almost halved as the company carried out a number of plant 
closures and sold a number of subsidiaries.  Having reported losses for a number of years in the 
early 1980s the company returned to profitability and recorded consistent growth from 1986 up to 
the year of privatisation (Reeves, 1999). 
Telecom Éireann (now Eircom) also implemented a large programme of rationalisation in the 
years preceding flotation.  Under the terms of agreements between trade unions and government 
employment was reduced from approximately 15,000 workers in 1988 to 12,000 in 1999.16  
Impending market liberalisation was a major driver of these measures as well as the decision to 
                                                 
16 In return for job losses, radical changes in work practices and cost reduction measures of €140m over five years, 
employees were granted 14.9 per cent of shares in the company.  In addition they agreed to contribute 5.3 per cent of 
salaries to their pension scheme, which historically was funded by the company. 
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enter a strategic alliance with the Comsource Consortium in 1996.  Although full market 
liberalisation was scheduled for January 1998, Telecom Éireann had faced increasing competition 
in a number of service markets since the early 1990s.17  The data presented in table 5 shows that 
these events were associated with sustained improvements in company performance in the mid-
1990s with return on capital employed growing by an annual average of 6 per cent in the five year 
period before flotation while the average growth in sales efficiency exceeded 10 per cent.   
Table 6: Pre-Privatisation Performance of Irish Life - Average Annual Rates of Growth (%) 
 
Company Employment 
% 
New business 
(sales) 
% 
Sales Efficiency 
% 
Income 
% 
Excess of Income 
over outgo 
% 
Irish Life 6.05 10.12 4.11 9.87 3.32 
 
Notes: (1) Sales Efficiency = New business written / Employees; Income = Premium income + investment income; Excess 
of Income over outgo = Income – (Claims + Admin Expenses + Taxation)  
 
The Irish Life Assurance Company also recorded improved performance prior to flotation in 1991. 
This can be seen in table 6, which includes performance indicators that are specific to the nature of 
the life assurance business. The five-year period prior to privatisation was characterised by 
significant growth in new business and employment as well as sustained improvements in sales 
efficiency.  In addition, the ‘surplus arising’18 measure which was adopted by the company until 
1989 for the purpose of measuring ‘value’, grew by an annual average of 3.3 per cent between 
1984 and 1989. 
In summary, with the exception of two enterprises that had long-standing financial difficulties 
(Irish Steel and B&I), the period before privatisation was characterised by improved performance 
when measured in terms of profitability and labour productivity. For the non-financial companies, 
rationalisation programmes involving large reductions in employment underpinned improved 
performance and, in the case of Telecom Éireann, the company faced gradually increased 
competition since the early 1990s.  The financial companies also improved performance before 
privatisation with the state banks in particular experiencing growth in business and employment 
during the period of dramatically improved macroeconomic performance.  This pattern of pre-
privatisation improvements is consistent with findings recorded in studies from other countries 
(Bishop and Kay (1989), Megginson et al (1994), Martin and Parker (1997)). A key question 
however, is whether observed efficiency gains are ‘static’ or ‘inherently once-off’ as a result of 
cost reductions, or whether they translate into long-term dynamic efficiency gains that depend 
more on innovations such as new products and production processes. 
4.2 Post-Privatisation Performance 
Our examination of post-privatisation performance is confined to the three companies sold by IPO 
as all other privatised companies were absorbed into the operations of relevant purchasing 
companies and separate post-privatisation data is not available from published accounts.  The data 
presented in tables 7 and 8 reveals that privatisation has been associated with a deterioration in the 
                                                 
17 The Terminal Equipment Directive in 1990 and the Leased Lines Directive in 1992 opened up markets for non-voice 
telephony services and the international call market respectively.  In 1996 a licence was granted to the second mobile 
operator ESAT Digiphone, which set up in direct competition with Telecom Éireann’s mobile arm, Eircell. 
18 Under the ‘surplus arising’ method, all the expenses associated with new business are written off in year one and a 
conservative view is taken on future liabilities.  No allowance is made for future profits on new business.   
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performance of Greencore and Eircom whilst Irish Life sustained the improved performance 
observed prior to divestiture.   
Over the nine-year period after privatisation Greencore (formerly Irish Sugar) recorded lower 
average rates of growth in sales efficiency and PBIT compared to the pre-privatisation period.  
Moreover the important return on capital employed (ROCE) declined on average following 
divestiture.  In 2000 the company reported net losses for the first time since the early 1980s.  It 
should be recognised that Greencore has made significant strategic changes over the last three 
years.  The purchase of Hazelwood Foods in December 2000 heralded a marked shift from 
ingredients and agribusiness activities to producing for the high-growth convenience food market.  
The full impact of this strategic change however is yet to be determined. 
The privatisation of Eircom in July 1999 led to a dramatic turnaround in the activities and 
performance of the company.  Within two and a half years of flotation the state-owned 
telecommunications company had de-merged its mobile telephone operation Eircell (May 2001) 
and the remaining fixed line business was taken over by the Valentia consortium (November 
2001).  For the purpose of comparability, the data presented in table 7 covers the two-year period 
between flotation and the break-up of the company.  While recognising the limitations of analysis 
based on just two years the data shows a marked decline in PBIT and ROCE.  This is attributable 
to an increase of 24 per cent in operating costs over the period 1999-2001.19  These data must be 
viewed in the context of a marked change in company strategy with the original objective of 
‘expanding international business’ (Annual Report, March 2000) replaced within months by a 
focus on exiting from certain international and multimedia activities and ultimately the decision to 
sell its mobile business which accounted for 70 per cent of the company’s market value.  By 
March 2002, the newly de-merged company reported after tax losses of over €80 million due to 
huge write-downs in the value of network assets, the sale of Eircell, and a drop in turnover at 
some key business units. 
Table 7: Post-Privatisation Performance of Greencore and Eircom -Average Annual Rates 
of Growth 
 
Company Employment 
% 
Turnover 
% 
Sales 
Efficiency 
% 
PBIT 
% 
ROCE 
% 
Greencore 9.08 6.77 -0.75 7.09 -3.41 
Eircom 3.86 3.39 -0.46 -20.35 -28.93 
 
Notes: (1) For Greencore and Eircom: Sales Efficiency = Turnover/Employees; PBIT = Operating profit before interest, tax 
and exceptional items; ROCE = PBIT / Net Assets Employed. (2) Eircom post-privatisation figures are 2-year averages. (3) 
Post-privatisation figures for Greencore are 9-year averages.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  An increase in employment from 12,606 to 13,121 was mainly attributable to the growing mobile phone business, which 
recorded an increase in employment of 611. 
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Table 8: Post-Privatisation Performance of Irish Life - Average Annual Rates of Growth 
(%) 
 
Company Employment 
% 
New business 
(sales) 
% 
Sales Efficiency 
% 
Income 
% 
Excess of Income 
over outgo 
% 
Irish Life 0.04 10.43 10.28 6.03 18.97 
 
Notes: (1) Sales Efficiency = New business written / Employees; Income = Premium income + investment income; Excess 
of Income over outgo = Income – (Claims + Admin Expenses + Taxation).  (2) Post-privatisation figures for Irish Life are 
7-year averages 
 
In the case of Irish Life, table 8 shows that pre-privatisation performance improvements were 
sustained following divestiture.  These improvements were reflected in the company’s share price, 
which remained above its IPO level from 1993 onwards and by the time it merged with Irish 
Permanent in 1999 was trading at 317 per cent20 above its IPO price.   
In summary, the Irish experience to date denies any simple relationship between ownership and 
performance.  In the majority of cases performance improvements were recorded in the pre-
privatisation period.  These ‘static efficiency gains’ are commonly observed in privatisation 
programmes and are generally associated with rationalisation programmes that include measures 
such as labour shedding and plant closures. 
The Irish privatisation experience has been largely disappointing in terms of performance after 
privatisation.  In addition to the cases of poor performance at Eircom and Greencore, the Irish 
Steel Company was closed five years after being taken over by the Indian multinational enterprise, 
ISPAT, with the company citing a failure to control costs (labour costs and electricity costs in 
particular) as the principal reason for closure.  It is particularly noteworthy that Greencore and 
Eircom were privatised when they were dominant players in their principal product markets.  
Greencore continued to hold Ireland’s EU sugar quota following divestiture while Eircom 
commanded over 80 per cent of the fixed line market and was one of only two players in the Irish 
mobile phone market.  The post-privatisation records of both companies provide strong support 
for the argument that competition in relevant markets is an important determinant of enterprise 
performance.   
The case of Eircom in particular raises important questions in relation to public policy.  The break-
up of the company and later changes in ownership were not foreseen at the time of flotation.  It is 
evident that these changes have not had a favourable impact on the performance and direction of 
the dominant player in Irelands telecommunications sector.  This is exemplified by severe 
reductions in the company’s capital expenditure programme21, which is manifest, for example, in 
Ireland lagging behind “leading countries with respect to the roll-out of broadband particularly to 
residential customers and SMEs” (Forfás, 2004: 3).  The case of Eircom highlights the wider 
implications of privatisation policy and demonstrates its importance as an instrument of national 
industrial policy. 
                                                 
20 At the time of the merger, Irish Life was outperforming the ISEQ index, which increased by 272 per cent over the same 
period of time since Irish Life’s flotation in 1991. 
21  Capital investment was reduced from €567m in 2000 to €276m in 2002. 
5. PRIVATISATION AND EXCHEQUER FINANCES 
Table 1 details that gross privatisation proceeds accrued to date by the Irish exchequer amount to 
almost €8.13bn.  Although this represents a considerable boon, the net position of the Exchequer 
depends on whether the assets are correctly priced and on the issue of direct and indirect costs.  
The data presented in tables 9 and 10 demonstrate the extent to which these costs and other factors 
such as debt write-offs ahead of divestiture have reduced the net privatisation proceeds to the 
exchequer.   
In the case of privatisation expenses (direct costs), table 9 shows that for Irish divestitures they 
amount to an aggregate of 1.41 per cent of gross proceeds (0.84 per cent on average), which is 
comparatively lower than levels recorded in the UK (see section 2.3). 
 
Table 9: Privatisation Proceeds, Expenses, Debt Write-Offs & ESOP costs: Ireland 1991-
2001. 
 
Company 
 
 
Proceeds 
(€m) 
(1) 
 
Professional 
Expenses 
(€m) 
(2) 
 
(2) as % 
of (1) 
 
 
Cost of Debt 
Write-Offs 
(€m) 
(3) 
(3) as % 
of (1) 
 
 
Cost of 
ESOP 
(€m) 
(4) 
(4) as % 
of (1) 
 
Greencore 210.65 1.73 0.82 - - - - 
Irish Life 601.93 9.40 1.56 - - - - 
B&I 10.80 N/A N/A 44.44 411.76 - - 
Irish Steel 0 3.59 N/A 43.73 N/A - - 
Eircom 6,399.91 97.64 1.53 - - 1,011.48 15.80 
ICC 322.27 0.91 0.28 - - 26.89 8.34 
TSB 408.35 0.77 0.19 - - 38.99 9.55 
INPC 20.00 1.43 1.24 90.00 77.59 10.16 8.76 
ACC 154.60 0.35 0.23 - - 12.39 8.12 
Total 8,128.51 115.82 1.41 178.17 2.17 1,099.91 13.38 
_____________________________________________________________ 
A second set of expenses that reduces gross proceeds includes financial undertakings on the part 
of the exchequer in order to prepare a company for divestiture. These commonly include debt 
write-offs and payment of other liabilities outstanding.  These are most likely to arise in the case 
of loss-making enterprises.  The sale of B&I and Irish Steel (both loss-makers) involved debt 
write-offs of over €40m each.  The full cost of these expenses is detailed in table 9.  While small 
in terms of total privatisation proceeds (2.17 per cent) the magnitude of these expenses has been 
considerable in the case of individual companies. 22 
A distinctive feature of the Irish privatisation programme in recent years has been the allocation of 
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22 A noteworthy feature of the sale of the Irish National Petroleum Company (INPC) in 2001 was the government guarantee 
of over €80m in the case of environmental expenses following transfer to the private sector.  A similar indemnity of €12.7m 
was agreed in the case of ACC Bank.  Although these liabilities may not materialise the indemnity represents a significant 
retention of risk by the public sector. 
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significant shareholdings to employees as part of the transfer of ownership.  These schemes are 
commonly referred to as Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which are normally granted 
in return for a restructuring and rationalisation deal.  The first such scheme was agreed in the case 
of Eircom, which was floated in 1999.  In this case, employees negotiated the ownership of 14.9 
per cent of issued share capital in the company.  This consisted of an allocation of 5 per cent of the 
total issued share capital in return for a rationalisation plan and 9.9 per cent of shares at a 
preferential rate (costing €240m).  Based on the proceeds from the sale of the 50.1 percent 
shareholding sold by the government (the Exchequer received €4.2bn), the 14.9 percent 
shareholding allocated to the ESOP was worth €1.25bn. The resultant discount therefore amounts 
to €1.01bn.  The negotiation of this ESOP set a precedent.  Since the sale of Eircom, ESOPs of 
14.9 per cent have been agreed in most subsequent sales.  The costs of ESOPs are presented in 
table 9. They are estimated to have cost the exchequer some €1.1 billion, which represents 13.38 
per cent of total privatisation proceeds. 
Table 10: Share Discounts in the case of IPOs of SOEs in Ireland 
 
Company Share Discount at IPO 
(%) 
Total 
Underpricing 
(€m) 
Total 
Underpricing 
(% of Gross 
Proceedings) 
Greencore 11.30 20.34 9.60 
Irish Life 4.38 21.66 3.60 
Eircom 18.46 777.57 12.15 
    
Total  819.60 9.97 
 
Notes: (1) The discount in case of Greencore includes cost of discount to Beet Growers.  (2) ESOP costs are included in 
table 7.   
 
An important set of expenses concerns underpricing (indirect costs).  Measuring the size of the 
difference between value and sale price is difficult because valuation relies on subjective 
judgements.  Hence, the most expedient and common means of calculating the undervaluation of 
shares sold by public flotation is to compare the difference between the price at which the 
government sells the shares and the prices at which they initially trade on the stock market (e.g. 
after one days trading).  This approach avoids the problems that arise if the price is affected by 
news that could not have been taken into account at the time when the shares were originally 
priced.   
On the basis of this approach, we estimate the extent of undervaluation in the case of the three 
SOEs that were sold by IPO.  The data in table 10 demonstrates that the discounts range from 4.38 
per cent (in the case of Irish Life) to 18.46 per cent (in the case of Eircom).  The total value of 
underpricing in the case of the three SOEs sold by IPO amounts to €819 million (almost 10 per 
cent of gross proceeds) – a sizeable loss of revenue to the Exchequer.  Compared to the UK 
however, these amounts are relatively small in absolute terms and in terms of total gross proceeds.  
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) calculated discounts ranging from 1 to 36 per cent in the case of IPOs 
in the UK with an average percentage discount of 19 per cent.  Jones et al (1999) in their 
empirical analysis of privatisation share offers across 59 countries, find that the mean level of 
underpricing or discounting for the 242 IPOs in their sample is 34.1 per cent and 9.4 per cent for 
the seasoned offers they analyse. 
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The comparatively low level of discounts observed in the case of Greencore and Irish Life (4.4 
and 11.3 per cent respectively) can be attributed to the method of sale chosen by the Government.  
The sales of these companies were executed in different stages with an initial offer establishing a 
market price.  This allowed later sales to be more accurately priced, thereby reducing the size of 
discounts.  Some authors have argued that this approach to privatisation maximises the returns to 
the Exchequer (Buckland (1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Jenkinson and Mayer (1994)).  This 
argument is supported by Harris and Lye’s (2001) analysis of Australian privatisations, which 
documents an average discount of 11.8 per cent, a result of the fact that many of the larger 
divestitures were executed in stages.  In the case of Eircom however, the Government elected to 
sell its entire 50.1 per cent shareholding at the initial public offering.  As a consequence, the level 
of underpricing (18.5 per cent) was significantly higher than in the cases of Greencore and Irish 
Life.  The Government’s decision to divest of its entire shareholding reflected the importance 
attached to attracting small investors.  A host of studies have shown that governments sell the 
shares of privatised enterprises at a discount in order to serve this objective.23  An underpriced 
fixed offer can attract considerable excess demand thereby allowing the government to exercise 
more discretion when allocating shares and create a shareholder list that fulfils its criteria.  The 
revenue that could have been generated had the government executed the sale of Eircom in the 
same manner as that of Greencore or Irish Life can be seen as a measure of the price put upon 
‘wider share ownership’ by government.24 
In summary, the sale of public enterprises has resulted in the realisation of significant revenues for 
the Irish exchequer over the period 1991-2001.  Whereas the costs of privatisation expenses and 
underpricing have been modest compared to the UK, the amounts are appreciable.  Moreover, 
when the costs incurred in the creation of ESOPs are included the estimate of revenues foregone is 
doubled to a total of €2.2 billion. 
6. DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation policies have significant effects on the distribution of wealth and resources in 
society.  The social welfare aspects of privatisation have however, received little attention in the 
international literature, in part due to methodological difficulties.  A full assessment of social 
welfare effects requires a cost-benefit analysis with identification of winners and losers, 
measurement of the gains and losses and some form of social weighting of the gains and losses 
before aggregating them.  “At this point economists usually retreat, commenting that income 
distribution issues are beyond their competence. However a proper study of the consequences of 
privatisation cannot avoid attention to gainers and losers” (Parker, 1999: 30).   
Studies that have examined welfare aspects of privatisation tend to be partial and focus on one or a 
small number of groups affected by privatisation policies.25  Typically these groups include 
workers (e.g. Haskel and Szymanski, 1993), shareholders (e.g. Saunders and Harris, 1994) and 
consumers (e.g. Waddams-Price and Hancock, 1998). 
For the purpose of this paper we confine our examination of the distributional effects of 
privatisation in Ireland to workers, investors and consumers. 
 
23 For example, Buckland (1987), Biais and Perotti (1997), Jones et al (1999) 
24 A similar point was made by Buckland (1987) in connection with some cases of privatisation in UK. 
25 One exception to the ‘partial analysis’ is a study by Galal et al (1994) who assessed the impact of ownership change on 
all relevant actors and stakeholders in the transactions.  They adopted a counterfactual approach in order to isolate the 
effects of ownership change from broader economic shifts and events. 
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83,161. 
6.1 Labour 
As noted above, Ireland’s privatisation programme has had an important impact on the welfare of 
workers with sizeable shareholdings secured by trade unions as a result of negotiated Employee 
Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs).  The precise details of ESOPs vary from case to case but in 
general they have involved the granting of free shares in return for acceptance of flexible working 
arrangements and sale of shares at considerable discounts.26  Table 11 summaries details of 
ESOPs to date and estimates that at the time of divestiture the value of ESOPs to each individual 
member ranged from €43,234 to €
In addition to providing monetary returns, ESOPs have served to allocate significant power and 
influence to workers. This is illustrated in the case of Eircom where the ESOT (the holding trust 
which operates the ESOP), which is dominated by the trade unions, held the balance of power in 
the takeover battle between two rival consortia that followed privatisation.  In return for its 
support the winning consortium, Valentia, granted the ESOP a doubling of its stake and trebled its 
representation on the board of Eircom. 
Table 11: Value of Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) in Privatised Irish Companies 
 
Company Shares held by 
ESOP at time 
of Sale (%) 
Value of 
Company at 
time of Sale 
(€m) 
Initial 
Value of 
ESOP (€m) 
Price paid by 
ESOP for 
9.9% stake 
(€m) 
Number of 
Employees in 
ESOP 
Value of ESOP 
per Member (€) 
Eircom 14.9 8,407.61 1,252.73 241.25 12,163 83,161 
ACC Bank 14.9 165.00 24.58 12.20 450 27,522 
ICC Bank 14.9 349.17 52.02 25.14 350 76,819 
TSB 14.9 430.44 64.13 25.14 1,200 32,496 
INPC 8.8 116.00 10.16 N/A 235 43,234 
 
Notes: (1) All ESOPs (except for the INPC) received 5 per cent of shares free in return for changes in work practices and 
voluntary redundancies, while the remaining 9.9 per cent stake was purchased by the ESOT at a discounted price. (2) 
Values per member are approximations (3) Estimates of ‘Value of ESOP per member’ take account of payments made by 
ESOTs in return for 9.9 per cent stakes in companies. 
 
Turning to employment, a commonly held view is that privatisation policies are normally 
associated with reductions in employment levels and diminutions in conditions of work (Martin, 
1993).  Empirical studies however, fail to provide conclusive evidence on this question.  
                                                 
26 For example, in return for a 5 per cent stake in ICC, the staff agreed to: increasing the hours in the working week; 
outsourcing of services; an open-ended option to reduce staff numbers on a voluntary basis; transfers within the bank; 
changes in duties; closer linking of performance and reward; no cost increasing claims to be submitted for a period of three 
years; and continuation of staff flexibility. 
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Megginson and Netter (2001), in their extensive review of empirical studies, found that three 
studies showed significant increases in employment, two studies found insignificant changes while 
five studies documented significant – sometimes massive – employment declines.  The authors 
conclude that the safest conclusion that they can assert is “that privatisation does not automatically 
mean employment reductions in divested firms – though this will likely occur unless sales can 
increase fast enough after divestiture to offset very large productivity gains” (2001: 357).  Table 
12 looks at levels of employment in privatised Irish companies in the five years before 
privatisation.  Significant reductions in employment are recorded in four of the eight companies 
examined (Eircom, Greencore, Irish Steel and B&I) while increases in employment were recorded 
for the other four (ACC, ICC, Irish Life and INPC).  Where post-privatisation data is available we 
find that three companies recorded reductions in employment (Greencore, Irish Life and Irish 
Steel) while Eircom recorded a significant increase of eight per cent.  The absence of any clear 
pattern is consistent with the findings of studies reviewed by Megginson and Netter (2001) and 
suggests that the impact of privatisation on employment is industry-specific. 
Table 12: Employment levels before and after privatisation 
 
Company 
 
Five Years Before 
Divestiture 
Year of 
Divestiture 
Post Divestiture 
 
Eircom 13,069 12,163 
13,121 
(2 Years after) 
Greencore 2,205 1,874 
1,675 
(5 Years after) 
Irish Life 1,635 2,190 
2,084 
(5 Years after) 
ACC 588 590 N/A 
ICC 308 350 N/A 
Irish Steel 635 433 
407 
(5 years after) 
B&I 1,411 897 N/A 
INPC 223 235 N/A 
 
Notes: (1) Post-privatisation data available for companies that continued as independent going-concerns. (2) Data for TSB 
not available. (3) At time of divestiture reductions of 140 and 250 jobs were planned for ACC and B&I respectively. 
 
6.2 Shareholders and Other Investors 
One important question in relation to the ownership of shares in newly privatised companies 
concerns the distribution of shares and whether privatisation has attracted significant numbers of 
small individual shareholders.  Earlier privatisations in the case of Ireland were not strongly 
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justified or advertised as a means of widening share ownership.  Nevertheless, when the 39.6 
million Greencore shares were initially offered, beet growers and employees had the option of 
buying more than a 10 per cent stake in the company.  In addition, almost 40 per cent of the shares 
initially offered were sold to small shareholders with the offer 5.5 times oversubscribed.   
On the basis of data provided in company accounts it can be deduced that the distribution of 
shareholdings in Greencore was characterised by stability in the three years following the 
flotation.27  The data also indicates that although there was a degree of ‘stagging’, this was short-
lived and the initial spread of shares was maintained. Smaller investors were also given 
preferential treatment when allocating shares during the IPO of Irish Life in 1991.  Thirty nine 
million shares (28 per cent of the total issue) were allocated to small investors and policyholders 
and the offer was three times oversubscribed.  Data from annual reports of Irish Life however, 
indicate that the number of shares held by small shareholders fell considerably (by over 20 per 
cent) within 4 years of the IPO.28   
Although the sales of Greencore and Irish Life involved appreciable allocations to small 
shareholders they were of considerably smaller scale compared to the case of Eircom.29  In this 
case the IPO was accompanied by an extensive advertising campaign and attracted over 574,000 
small shareholders who purchased 78 per cent of shares floated in 1999.  Significantly, when 
Eircom was broken up in 2001 and separate sales were completed for its mobile telephone 
(Eircell) and fixed line businesses, the number of small shareholders was 450,000.  
Table 13: Real Returns to individual investors (internal rate of return) 
 
Company IRR after one 
year (%) 
IRR after two 
years (%) 
IRR after three 
years (%) 
IRR after five 
years (%) 
IRR after seven years 
(%) 
Greencore 28.70 21.45 25.31 28.52 27.44 
Irish Life 20.07 22.99 14.82 14.22 28.35 
Eircom -21.95 -38.53 n/a n/a n/a 
 
The returns accrued by investors in the three companies floated on the stock market are 
summarised in table 13.  The calculation of internal rates of return (IRR) is based on a single 
individual that invested in the company on day of flotation.30  Whereas annual returns to investors 
in Greencore and Irish Life exceeded 27 per cent in the seven years after flotation, investors in 
Eircom incurred average losses of 39 per cent in the two years prior to the de-merger of the 
                                                 
27 Data provided in Company Annual Reports indicates that although the number in the smallest category of shareholders 
(owning under 1,001 shares) fell by only 9.5 per cent between 1992-94, the number owning between 1,001 and 5,000 
shares increased by 72 per cent.  Furthermore, there was a 40 per cent increase in the number of shares owned by the 
smallest two categories of shareholders. 
28 Data from Company Annual Reports shows that after the IPO, some 97 percent of shareholders held less than 5,000 
shares in Irish Life, which represented approximately 9 per cent of the shares in the company.  While the percentage of 
shareholders that held less than 5,000 shares remained stable between 1992 and 1995, the number of shares that they held 
fell by 20 percent. 
29 In the cases of Greencore and Irish Life, 40 and 28 per cent of shares respectively were allocated to small shareholders.   
30 The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) sets the present value of the revenue flow equal to the present value of the initial 
investment resulting in an annual percentage yield on the purchase price of shares.  The yield is based on the assumption 
that an individual purchased the share at flotation and by taking the yearly dividend flow.  All cashflows were measured in 
real terms. 
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company. 
In November 2001 (almost two and a half years after privatisation), Eircom was taken over by the 
Valentia consortium consisting of a small group of equity partners and the ESOT.  In contrast to 
small shareholders who participated in the initial flotation, these investors made massive returns 
on their investment.  Within seven months of the takeover a re-structuring of the company’s debt 
yielded a dividend of €512m, which amounted to 76 per cent of the original equity investment.  In 
March 2003 the company was re-floated on the stock exchange with investors accruing a capital 
gain of over 20 per cent.31 
6.3 Consumers 
Proponents of privatisation commonly cite reduced consumer prices and improved service.  This is 
attributed to efficiency gains being passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.  The 
experience with privatisation of utilities in the UK suggests that price reductions are dependent on 
ownership in conjunction with competition, regulation and technological change.  There is 
mounting evidence of falling prices in privatised utilities in the UK, reflecting gains in productive 
efficiency.  Parker (2003) provides some examples: in telecommunications average charges fell by 
around 40 per cent (in real terms) between 1987 and 1997; in the gas sector, domestic gas bills fell 
by an average of 2.6 per cent per year after privatisation (in real terms); in electricity a decline of 
26 per cent in charges to domestic users was recorded.  The exception to this trend was the water 
and sewerage industry where domestic charges rose sharply after privatisation, by over 40 per cent 
(in real terms). 
It is noteworthy that Parker stresses that the price reductions observed in the telecommunications 
industry “certainly results from changes in technology and competition in addition to ownership 
change and regulation” (2003: 13).  Moreover the price increases recorded in the water sector 
reflect the lack of competition in water services since privatisation. Due to limitations in data 
availability our analysis of the impact of competition and privatisation in Ireland is confined to the 
case of Eircom where the experience to date exemplifies the benefits of increased competition 
rather than ownership. In its review of regulatory reform in Ireland the OECD (2001) noted that 
where competition in telecommunications had developed prior to 1998, the consumer had 
benefited from significant price reductions.  For example, in the case of international calls, 
competition (mainly through indirect competition, e.g. call-back services) coincided with 
continuous price reductions since 1994.  Ireland’s ranking in the OECD basket of international 
telephone charges fell from ‘above average’ to less than half the average between 1994 and 2000 
(OECD, 2001).   
This trend of falling prices for international calls continued after privatisation in 1999 in line with 
Eircoms falling market share.32  However, in the market for domestic calls where Eircom have 
held a market share of over 80 per cent since privatisation, only marginal reductions in prices have 
been observed (ComReg, 2004).  In addition, there are indications that privatisation has been 
associated with reductions in service quality with the former monopoly significantly reducing its 
number of payphones33 and the regulator expressing concerns about Eircom’s delivery of 
universal service obligations in relation to connection to the fixed public telephone network.34   
 
31 This approximate value is based on an initial equity investment of €676m and proceeds to equity investors of €873m 
32 ComReg (2004: 39,48) report that over the period 2002-2004, Eircom’s share of the international call market fell from 75 
per cent (of revenues) to 68 per cent while prices fell by between 20 and 40 per cent depending on destination and time. 
33 Eircom reduced the number of public payphones from 7,796 to 6,300 between March 2001-March 2003, Irish Times, 
March 13th, 2004. 
34  Irish Times, April 28th, 2004. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
Although comparatively late with respect to initiating a programme of privatisation, Ireland now 
ranks highly amongst OECD industrialised countries in terms of the proportion of former SOEs 
sold and the aggregate revenues generated to date.  Where privatisation has occurred, policy 
choices in the main have been driven by pragmatism and considerations specific to individual 
enterprises rather than doctrine (as was the case in the UK).  Patterns are difficult to discern.  The 
first two privatisations (Greencore and Irish Life) were largely prompted by lobbying from senior 
management who favoured divestiture.  The following two sales (B&I and Irish Steel) were 
attributable to the government’s desire to withdraw from enterprises that were financially 
unsustainable.  In recent years privatisation decisions have been heavily influenced by Ireland’s 
membership of the EU.  Loss-making making companies can no longer rely on state subsidies and 
are therefore candidates for divestiture while the de-regulation of markets increases the likelihood 
of privatisation of state-owned utilities (for example, Eircom). 
Our analysis of Ireland’s privatisation programme focuses on three key aspects: enterprise 
performance, impact on the exchequer and distributional effects.  The Irish experience fails to 
provide support for privatisation per se as a means of improving performance.  Significantly, the 
evidence indicates that two of the three companies examined performed poorly following 
privatisation while the Irish Steel Company was put into liquidation five years after divestiture.  
Furthermore, the cases of Eircom and Greencore point to the importance of product market 
competition as a determinant of performance. 
A distinctive feature of Ireland’s privatisation programme has been the granting of sizeable 
shareholdings to workers. ESOPs have resulted in significant redistributions of wealth and 
corporate power in favour of employees.  Moreover, they account for half of all revenues foregone 
by the exchequer as a result of privatisation policies.  Others to benefit from privatisation 
programmes include investors but these in the main have been large and institutional investors as 
the vast majority of small shareholders to date were investors in Eircom who incurred sizeable 
losses. 
As most of the enterprises remaining under public ownership reside in strategically important 
sectors (for example gas, electricity, transport), relevant lessons can be drawn from Ireland’s 
biggest privatisation to date – the former public utility Eircom.  Since divestiture in 1999 the 
company has been de-merged, de-listed and re-floated.  These changes have significant economic 
and social effects many of which were unexpected at the time of privatisation.  They underscore 
the importance of framing privatisation decisions as part of a coherent overall industrial policy and 
draw attention to the magnitude of the regulatory challenge posed in the post-privatisation 
environment. 
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